

The *Board of Peace*: Is it what it's supposed to be?

Insights

So, what exactly is the Board of Peace?

We have all seen snippets of it on main media streams, glanced over mentions of it in print and, mostly dissing it as yet another Trump distraction.

BUT....


Let us deep dive a little into it – there actually may be some substance to it.

What the Board of Peace Is and Why It Matters in Today's Geopolitical System

The Board of Peace is a newly-created international organisation that emerged in early 2026 against the backdrop of the Gaza ceasefire and reconstruction effort. While early media coverage often framed it as another short lived political initiative, a closer examination suggests it represents a more substantive – and unconventional – experiment in international governance.

Formally established in January 2026 and welcomed by **UN Security Council Resolution 2803** in November 2025, the Board originated as a coordinating mechanism for Gaza's post war administration and reconstruction. Importantly, the UN resolution did not mandate the Board nor grant it universal authority.

Instead, it acknowledged the Board as a transitional and coordinating body operating outside the formal UN system. This distinction is central to understanding both the Board's potential strengths and its inherent limitations.



Although Gaza was the catalyst, the Board's final charter articulates a much broader ambition. It positions the institution as a standing peace building body capable of operating across multiple conflict and post conflict zones, rather than as a single issue vehicle tied exclusively to Gaza. In this sense, the Board is best understood not as a UN substitute, but as a parallel structure designed to bypass some of the procedural and consensus constraints that characterise traditional multilateral institutions.

How the Board Operates: Governance Structure, Power Dynamics and Regional Influence

At the core of the Board's design is an explicitly centralised governance model. The organisation is chaired in perpetuity by U.S. President Donald J. Trump, with the Chair holding extensive authority, including the power to invite or exclude members, approve or veto resolutions, and break voting ties. Membership is by-invitation only and structured around two tiers: permanent members, who secure long term participation through a USD 1 billion capital contribution, and term members, who serve renewable three year mandates. By early 2026, roughly 25 states had signed the charter out of approximately 60 invited.

From a policy perspective, this architecture represents a clear departure from consensus driven multilateralism. Decision making authority is deliberately concentrated, with speed and decisiveness prioritised over broad representation. At the same time, the Board introduces a capital anchored model of participation, linking geopolitical influence directly to financial commitment. In practice, this has enabled the rapid mobilisation of multi billion dollar pledges for reconstruction and humanitarian support, with the World Bank designated to manage and disburse funds under the Board's strategic direction.

The Board's stated mission is threefold: to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict. Operationally, this translates into coordinating post conflict reconstruction and humanitarian funding, supporting transitional governance frameworks, overseeing demilitarisation and security stabilisation, and developing replicable peace building practices. While the initial operational focus remains Gaza, the absence of any geographic limitation in the charter leaves open the possibility of future expansion.

These features make the Board a potentially powerful coordination hub, particularly in environments where political authority, security oversight and capital allocation must move in tandem. In effect, it resembles a “coalition of capital” rather than a traditional rules based multilateral lender. Should it succeed in stabilising target regions, the resulting compression of political risk could have meaningful economic and investment implications.

That said, the Board’s structure has attracted material criticism. The concentration of authority in the Chair raises governance and accountability concerns, while the Board’s parallel existence risks friction with established UN mechanisms and broader multilateral norms. Moreover, the charter’s broad mandate leaves unresolved questions around geographic scope, duration of involvement and exit strategies in post conflict settings.

These tensions are particularly visible in the context of the current Iran war.

The Board of Peace in Current Conflicts: Iran Tensions and Diplomatic Limits

To date, the Board has not functioned as a peace broker between Washington and Tehran. Iran is not a member, does not recognise the Board as neutral, and has publicly rejected claims of direct engagement.

Instead, the Board’s role has been indirect. It has acted as a coordination framework around U.S. ceasefire proposals — notably the recently discussed 15 point framework — and as a mechanism to prevent the Iran conflict from derailing the Gaza stabilisation process entirely.

In parallel, the Board has served as a platform for indirect diplomacy. Its envoys have continued engagement with Hamas in Cairo, while regional member states such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have used their Board participation as diplomatic cover to pursue mediation channels with Tehran outside the U.S.–Iran bilateral track. In this sense, the Board operates less as a negotiating table and more as a diplomatic clearinghouse.

Looking forward, the most realistic application of the Board to the Iran war lies not in imposing peace, but in structuring de-escalation and managing consequences. Analysts broadly agree that its comparative advantage is in sequencing an off ramp — potentially involving phased ceasefires, conditional sanctions relief, maritime de confliction in the Strait of Hormuz and commitments to restrain proxy activity.

Should the conflict de escalate or freeze, the Board could then be repurposed as a post-conflict containment and reconstruction body, coordinating humanitarian stabilisation and reducing spillover risks across Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf and global shipping lanes.

Crucially, there are limits to what the Board can achieve. Embedded within a wartime command environment and closely associated with U.S. leverage, it lacks the neutrality required to act as a trusted mediator in Tehran’s eyes. More fundamentally, it cannot substitute for a domestic political settlement inside Iran. Absent a credible political design, military degradation alone risks regime fragmentation, proxy violence and long term regional instability — challenges that sit beyond the Board’s current remit.

In net terms, the Board of Peace should be viewed as a structural experiment in international governance rather than a conventional peace institution. Its value lies in coordination, capital mobilisation and post conflict sequencing, not in diplomacy for its own sake. For policymakers, it is most useful after peak escalation rather than during active conflict. For investors, its relevance is second order, influencing risk premia, energy volatility and long dated reconstruction optionality more than near term asset pricing.

The Board’s long term significance will ultimately depend on three factors: whether it can deliver tangible results in Gaza, whether member states remain committed as geopolitical conditions evolve, and whether it can coexist with (rather than collide with) existing global institutions. Whether it proves a durable innovation or a transient construct remains an open question, but it is no longer credible to dismiss it as mere political theatre.

Taking all of this into account, we think that the Board of Peace can be applied to the Iran war only as a framework for managing consequences and enabling an off ramp, not as a neutral peace broker. Its value lies in what comes after escalation, not in stopping the escalation itself.

What This Means for Markets: Infrastructure, Energy and Reconstruction Opportunities

To this extent, we would be prepared to invest in potential opportunities, in:

- Infrastructure
- Energy logistics
- Utilities and construction materials.

This is not a near term trade, but a watch list opportunity, contingent upon:

- A clear de-escalation and,
- Capital deployment via multilateral channels

Appendix 1

Confirmed Member States:



(Charter signatories / participating member states as of Q1, 2026)
Source: Board of Peace website

Looking at the list of members, is it any wonder then, why Gulf states have been tolerant of Iran’s continued attacks on their soil..

Appendix 2: Extracts of The Charter as presented at the Davos World Economic Forum:

Source: Board of Peace website, <https://boardofpeace.org/presentations>



National Committee for the Administration of Gaza

اللجنة الوطنية لإدارة غزة

Mission Statement

“Authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution 2803 and President Donald J. Trump’s 20-Point Plan, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) is dedicated to transforming the transitional period in Gaza into a foundation for lasting Palestinian prosperity. Under the guidance of the Board of Peace, chaired by President Donald J. Trump, and with the support and assistance of the High Representative for Gaza, our mission is to rebuild the Gaza Strip not just in infrastructure but also in spirit.

We are committed to establishing security, restoring the essential services that form the bedrock of human dignity such as electricity, water, healthcare, and education, as well as cultivating a society rooted in peace, democracy, and justice. Operating with the highest standards of integrity and transparency, the NCAG will forge a productive economy capable of replacing unemployment with opportunity for all. We embrace peace, through which we strive to secure the path to true Palestinian rights and self-determination.”

New Rafah

100k+ Permanent Housing Units	200+ Education Centers
180+ Cultural, Religious & Vocational Centers	75+ Medical Facilities

New Gaza

- Transportation Hub
- Coastal Tourism
- Energy & Digital Infrastructure

Empowering Gazans with Jobs, Training, and Services

\$10bn+ Expected GDP in 10 years (by 2035)	500k+ New Jobs in Construction, Agriculture, Manufacturing, Services & Digital Economy	\$25bn+ Investments in Modern, Reliable Utilities & Public Services
\$13k+ Average annual household income in 10 years (by 2035)	\$1.5bn+ Investments in Vocational Schools & (Re-)Training for Full Labor Force	\$3bn+ Investments in Commercial Zones, Business Districts, & Microgrants / Loans

Next 100 Day Focus

Excerpts from the 20-Point Peace Plan

Humanitarian Aid

“All aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. Quarantines will be consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025, agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.”

Reconstruction

Improved temporary housing in transition until permanent housing is ready

“A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize Gaza will be created. Synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza. A special economic zone will be established, with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries.”

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